

**Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr.**

*University of Georgia*

**Kenneth I. Hanf**

*Pompeu Fabra University*

# American Public Administration and Impacts of International Governance

*Increasingly, public administration in the United States operates in a densely interconnected international system in which local decisions and actions may trigger global repercussions—and vice versa—and the fate of communities in one region is bound to the choices of decision makers elsewhere. Administrative actors have become enmeshed in a complicated, interwoven pattern of governance in ways that shape actions, issues, and opportunities for influencing administrative agencies at national, state, and local levels. These developments call for a critical reappraisal of our inherited notions of governance, management, and accountability. Terrorist tragedy and responses to it call attention to these themes, but they apply broadly across the spectrum of governance challenges. To demonstrate this point, we analyze some implications of transnational governance for the institutions and practices of U.S. public management, with particular attention to another subject: environmental policy and management. A conclusion is that the public administration community must adjust traditional practices to facilitate the effective management of the global processes that, in turn, reshape the world.*

Contrasts between global headlines and the day-to-day work of public managers seem, at first blush, immense. Yet, in an important sense, one is the obverse of the other. Federal and state environmental managers address issues of air quality in metropolitan regions, while world leaders voice open criticism of the laggard status of the United States in dealing with threats from global climate change. State and local public programs aimed at achieving economic development occupy the energies of thousands of officials, while the impact of such efforts is strongly influenced by provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S. diplomats negotiate regimes to halt the flow of drugs from Latin America, while employees of several federal departments, state police agencies, and local law enforcement units sift through narcotics intelligence, search ships, and monitor suspected transport routes.

Far more vividly, managing threats from terrorism engages the efforts of many U.S. agencies—national and subnational—as aspects of the problem are negotiated at home and abroad. While New York City rescue crews

sought to locate survivors in the wake of the September 11 attack, NATO convened in an unprecedented emergency session to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in assistance of American defense. While diplomats in the State Department tried to build a coalition for sustained antiterror efforts worldwide, FBI agents worked closely

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**Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr.**, is the Margaret Hughes and Robert T. Golembiewski Professor of Public Administration in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. He also serves as a senior research associate in the Carl Vinson Institute of Government. He is the author or coauthor of many studies focusing on policy implementation and public management in complex institutional settings, policy networks, and environmental policy and management. His most recent book is *Advancing Public Management* (Georgetown University Press, 2000, coedited), and he is a coeditor of the new Johns Hopkins Studies in Governance and Public Management, with the Johns Hopkins University Press. **Email:** [cmsotool@arches.uga.edu](mailto:cmsotool@arches.uga.edu).

**Kenneth I. Hanf** is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology of the Pompeu Fabra University of Barcelona. Previously, he was a senior member of the Department of Public Management of the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Netherlands. He is the author and coauthor of numerous studies dealing with the making and implementation of policy in multilevel systems of governance. His most recent book, edited with Arild Underdal, is *International Environmental Agreements and Domestic Politics* (Ashgate, 2000). He also serves on the editorial board of *European Environmental Policy*. **Email:** [kenhanf@wanadoo.es](mailto:kenhanf@wanadoo.es).

with police and investigatory units in numerous countries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention coordinated their bioterrorism efforts with foreign public health authorities, and bank regulators cooperated with colleagues abroad to tighten international financial systems.

Daily, significant issues breach national borders in ways that confront administrative decision makers with new challenges to which no single actor can respond adequately. While “globalization”<sup>1</sup> has become a much-abused cliché, researchers and practitioners of public administration, particularly in the United States, have yet to recognize the myriad ways that transnational developments frame and shape virtually the entire gamut of specialties and issues facing the field. U.S. administrative actors at all levels have already become insinuated into almost countless numbers of complicatedly, networked arrays of governance (Frederickson 1999)—including components of social self-organizing and market arrangements as well as formal governing patterns.

These developments do not signify the collapse of nation-centered public administration, but they do reshape the sets of relations within which U.S. officials carry out their responsibilities. In today’s administrative world, not to mention the future, these shifts call for a revision and critical reappraisal of our inherited notions of governance, management, and accountability. Even the contents and competencies of specialties in the practical details of administration are being refashioned in ways that scarcely have been noted, let alone examined in depth.

This article offers a sketch of this emerging administrative world, and it paints in broad strokes some of the revised landscape onto which U.S. administrators have begun to trod. Regarding responses to terrorism, and also more generally, it projects neither a benignly optimistic future for administrators, nor any strong likelihood that the role or importance of nation- and subnation-focused administration will diminish appreciably. But the world has been changing in fashions that are consequential for the kinds and channels of influence available to administrators as well as the modes of action directed toward them. To the extent that American public administration has become enmeshed in a complicatedly, interwoven international system of governance, this development will shape the actions, issues, and opportunities for influence afforded administrative agencies at national, state, and local levels.

For administrators to operate effectively and responsibly in this altered world, patterns of governance must be clearly apprehended. For researchers to frame the most significant questions to investigate, these changes must first be examined carefully. The next section offers a broad outline of the emerging picture, one emphasizing the underrecognized importance of international agreements involving many countries in setting the framework for

transnational governance arrangements into the future. Singled out for special attention are the policies and international regimes devoted to transnational environmental questions. This subject is chosen to lend concreteness and depth to the coverage, while also showing that the field of national security is by no means unique in its transnational character. The article then offers an analytical portrait of the emerging system of global governance, which increasingly defines the broader institutional context within which the United States acts. Subsequently, coverage turns to public administration and the impact of the altered world of governance for administrative operations within the United States.

## Globalizing Governance: An Overview

The changed and changing context of public administration in the United States is best understood as one part of a shifting landscape of governance worldwide. Much is new about the forms and dynamics of present processes that link elements of political, social, and economic life ever more closely around the globe—particularly regarding the complexity of such arrangements today and the dramatically reduced time and varied transaction costs attending the expansion of global ties. One result is a set of significant limitations on the scope of unilateral action that is available to any given state (Held 1996, 20; Pierre and Peters 2000, 56–57). Although opinions differ regarding the degree to which economic forces have been internationalized, there is considerable consensus on the emergence of a disjuncture between the formal authority of any state and the spatial reach of contemporary systems of production, distribution, and exchange.

But those who would proclaim the death of the nation-state are premature. Key themes of this article, in fact, are that (1) the multiple forms of transnational cooperation that have emerged both limit national “autonomy” and also facilitate effective national action; and (2) public administration is a crucially important component of this dynamic.

The validity of the first point is seen in the creation of various forms of transnational cooperation. A vast array of regimes and organizations has been established to manage whole fields of activity and collective policy problems (Zacher 1993)—indeed, the United States has had to take explicit account of this complex matrix of ties in the aftermath of, and also long before, the catalyzing events of September 11. The spectrum of international agencies runs from those concerned primarily with technical, noncontroversial activities (Universal Postal Union, International Telecommunications Union, World Meteorological Organization) to those involved in more controversial questions about managing and allocating resources (United Nations,

World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). Also significant is a range of informal global networks, such as the G-8 grouping of economic powers.

This growing institutionalization consists of initiatives that are designed to facilitate the management of policy challenges beyond the control of any single state. International organizations have been recognized for decades as constituent parts of governance. Development of transnational networks, a recent trend, has had a crucial impact in this increasingly fluid era. The events of September 11 involved casualties from approximately 80 nations and were executed by operatives of an international terrorist network, al-Qaeda, with elements in perhaps 60 countries worldwide and a key coordinative node in the then-pariah state of Afghanistan. Responses, in turn, came not only from single countries and the European Union, NATO, and the 56-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference, but also from an array of more loosely networked actors spanning many nations—including extensive and intensive collaboration by numerous U.S. agencies working with counterpart units in many other countries on behalf of “homeland security.” Counterterrorism suffers if it is conceived of only in terms of traditional organization-focused frames of reference (Wise 2002). Like global climate change and other international challenges, it too requires the involvement and effective collaboration of networked arrays of disparate actors within and without international organizations.

The development of problem-specific arrangements, each with a different spatial reach, is now a major fact of politico-administrative life, with consequences for the conduct of administration. These forms of multilateral decision making exhibit distinctive patterns involving governments, intergovernmental bodies, and a variety of international nongovernmental organizations. Nonstate actors or transnational bodies (multinational corporations, pressure groups, professional associations) participate actively, as do national, regional, and local government actors in different international arenas. The global expanse has become a highly complex, mixed-actor system. Furthermore, the problem-specific systems ramify into each other, often in unanticipated fashions. At the time NAFTA was developed, it was clear that trade agreements carry implications for environmental protection; few, on the other hand, had analyzed the implications of NAFTA for cross-border control of international terrorism.

Such complex arrays are most appropriately considered as evidence of strategies to reassert state control rather than of states’ surrendering to competing models of governance (Pierre and Peters 2000, 16). To an increasing degree, a government’s success in pursuing domestically defined national objectives depends on how effectively it can act

within changing institutional contexts, including new transnational institutions. In this sense, the latter are not “outside” the state, imposing restrictions on its autonomy; rather, they function as new “opportunity structures” through which national actors can search for ways to pursue their domestic agendas—of course, under restrictions and implications flowing from forms of cooperative endeavor. Participants cannot do exactly what they may want—something, in any case, they cannot achieve on their own. Government actors find themselves necessarily engaged in forms of “collaborative management.”<sup>2</sup> The state is being reshaped, with qualitative changes evident in relationships among actors from different levels that cannot be adequately captured by the idea of “decline.” The operative notion, rather, is that of “enmeshment.”

## The American Variant and an Environmental Slice

American public administration thus operates in a densely interconnected system in which local decisions and actions may trigger global repercussions—and vice versa—and the fate of communities in one region is bound to choices by decision makers elsewhere.

The array of recent U.S. international commitments demonstrates the depth and breadth of current involvement. Formal international commitments consist of both treaties and executive agreements. The latter are far more numerous, even if often less visible. Both categories carry the force of law. A recent tabulation of *new* bi- and multilateral agreements entered into by the United States during 1981–96 totals 2,969, including numerous instances in virtually every policy field (Caruson 2001).<sup>3</sup> Bilateral agreements are by far more numerous, more than 90 percent. Including the second Clinton term as well as earlier agreements that are still in force would further expand the total. Virtually all of these involve nontrivial contributions by and implications for American public administrators. Recent developments regarding terrorism and international efforts to address its challenges clearly fit into, and must take account of, this developing system. But it would be a mistake to view the implications as largely confined to the highly salient theme of security. In fact, the system now cuts across and carries implications for virtually every policy field and nearly every American priority.

Environmental challenges provide a vivid set of illustrations. Given that the state of the environment in any country is not merely the result of intranational forces, it is not sufficient to emphasize—as even the best recent scholarship on U.S. public management for the environment does—domestic matters to the exclusion of other international factors (O’Leary et al. 1999). Dealing with the salient environmental challenges requires finding ways to

gain the cooperation of governments of other countries (Caldwell 1996).

Scenes of violent protestors in such cities as Seattle and Genoa create a casual impression that activists oppose the proliferation of international patterns of governance. But a central element of this opposition has been the rejection of efforts to globalize markets without corresponding multilateral initiatives on workforces and environmental safeguards. Many opponents of globalization have an agenda that, in effect, presses for *more* internationalization on certain key causes. And while Washington's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol understandably made headlines worldwide, the predominant trend has been toward the development of international commitments. Nor should it obscure the fact that the United States has played a leadership role in pushing for international cooperation on environmental problems. For environmental policy and management, more than 170 multilateral agreements have been adopted, most within the last 25 years (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; UNEP 1993). This count excludes bilateral agreements and includes only multilateral ones solely focused on environmental questions. Many of the agreements incorporate multiple legal instruments; more than 900 such instruments are currently in force (Jacobson and Weiss 1998, 1). Finally, many other agreements are under negotiation now, dealing with persistent organic pollutants, liability and compensation for transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, biosafety, and transboundary movements of heavy metals. Developments on such fronts, furthermore, can become insinuated into a range of other issues. In 2002, when U.S. political leaders tried to engage other nations in an international effort to disrupt terrorist networks, the issue was explicitly linked by European counterparts to American refusal to join the broad coalition on global climate change, among other nettlesome issues (such as defense). An antiterrorism agenda cannot be leveraged without multilateral enmeshment in several ostensibly far-flung policy fields.

For the United States and other nations, furthermore, each agreement responds to and stimulates domestic administrative activity. While this country has drawn scorn recently for environmental unilateralism, administrators in many agencies are busily at work implementing (and in some cases working toward the expansion of) such agreements as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion, and others.

These details illustrate a general tendency, and any effective long-term response to the events of September 11 must be built on a recognition of the general features of this system of governance and the place of U.S. public administration in it. That thousands of such agreements are in force is presumptive evidence that administrators

are already heavily involved in policy and programs that extend beyond the borders—even if they may be unaware of it. But multilateral agreements constitute the significant core of the emerging governance pattern. These are visible signs of globalizing arrangements that involve administrators in the most consequential ways. The remainder of this analysis concentrates on the importance of multilateral international agreements and their implications for American public administration.

## The Emerging Governance Framework: An Analytical View

It should be clear that the future of governance in an era of globalization is already a reality. Scholars of public administration, however, have generally failed to depict the full system with sufficient detail to identify analytically important features. A focus on international organizations has been part of the classic characterization; this article reemphasizes the international dimension, but in the context of global governance rather than through the treatment of the activities and decisions of international organizations as such. A valid depiction can be helpful in avoiding either overwrought or overly sanguine projections, and careful analysis can sketch a range of specific impacts on public administration.

What can be said about the emerging world of governance? The general features have already arrived. For the most part, this subject has typically been sketched in rather abstract fashion (Farazmand 1999), with emphasis on pressures regarding economic competitiveness (Tolchin 1996) or in connection with the emerging importance of certain regions (Welch and Wong 1998). The international dimensions of administration often have been seen in traditional and visible international bodies, with their own bureaucratic arrangements, such as the United Nations (Heady 1998). The analysis offered by Huddleston (2000), perhaps the most vivid and incisive characterization, builds on the emergence of another “layer” to the governance system that tends, in important respects, to reproduce institutional characteristics that are reminiscent of state systems.

These treatments share a virtual neglect of the full array of existing transnational governance institutions (although Huddleston in particular is cognizant of the pattern). The present analysis proceeds from current arrangements and is grounded in these realities.

Second, the features of transnational governance do not suggest anything like a global government, designed more or less on the model of state-centered systems. Nor does an examination of the current system support a blanket characterization of globalized governance as, in effect, a mere facilitative vehicle for global capital—al-

though, of course, the forces of global capitalism are important in the system. Rather, what one sees is the establishment of many functionally specific, multilateral regimes, often with some kind of (typically tiny) secretariat at the supranational level, but with the major portion of involved institutions and human talent retained in and by signatory states and their subnational elements. These are self-woven into and contribute to the shaping of the transnational order. Their administrative functions remain crucial, even if administration is being shaped by and through the globalizing developments.

This portrayal differs considerably from that of Huddleston, who sees dynamics leading to an “evaporation” (689) of the rationale for the state and sketches scenarios that sit on a “darkling plain” of governance. One future would be a world of “global regime management” represented by “a stripped-down, geographically rooted state *body* enforcing norms set by a powerful, nongeographically rooted, nonstate *head*” with “far smaller” national administrative systems and the “interesting work” lodged within the bulked-up transnational system (677, emphasis added). The other scenario is even more pessimistic: “neomedieval administration” with “chaos, disorder, and conflict” because “no stable authority structures will emerge” (678).

The current analysis suggests the shape of transnational governance to date supports neither scenario, nor does it cohere with the implicitly benign assumptions of the more standard coverage. Both scenarios are, ironically, premised on a state-centered notion of suprastate governance and suggest a reproduction of state-like features at the international level.<sup>4</sup> “Global regime management” envisions a withering of states and the emergence of a muscular regime. The more chaotic scenario is neomedieval, in that the state fails and no coherent governance arrangements develop. That a “crisis of governance” might be addressed through other adaptations—indeed, that some of the emerging system seems already in place—is not considered.

In practice, globalized governance has resulted in neither the atrophy of the state nor the emergence of a global elite in an increasingly robust transnational regime to which nations must simply submit. Instead, governance has shifted, and transnational developments are dramatically changing administration in fashions yet to be fully analyzed. But some aspects are now in place, and these suggest more complexity and variety than extant analyses indicate. Further, they do not signal any substantial diminution of administration within national settings.

Consider the massive set of international agreements to which the United States is a party. The total represents commitments in virtually every sphere of policy and carries implications for nearly every national agency. They form no unitary, coherent international regime but are

embedded in a panoply of them. Note, too, how the U.S. response to the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 provoked the American government to execute nonstandard and vastly expanded production of an antibiotic whose patent was held by a German firm. This initiative could not be pressed in isolation because it carried implications for World Trade Organization negotiations in Qatar on the “right of developing countries to breach drug patents to combat public health crises such as AIDS” (Moynihan and Roberts 2002, 139).

The vast set of international regimes and understandings does not constitute a neomedieval chaos, any more than the hundreds of governments in a large U.S. metropolitan area represent a descent onto a darkling urban plain. The web of international commitments has emerged in the presence and with the necessary participation of the nation and its institutions. The emergence of this new governance does not necessarily signal a recapitulation of national-level functions and designs at the transnational level. Instead, the embeddedness is considerably more complex, with many networks and many functionally specific regimes coexisting. Virtually all rely very heavily on national institutions, support, and administrative capacity for effective governance. They vary widely in performance; indeed, one key research question is how to explain this variance. The international bodies that are specifically assigned to these regimes are, for the most part, rather feeble, even in some interestingly successful instances. At least some of the evidence indicates that, although traditional notions of go-it-alone sovereignty may be under serious challenge, this development does not logically entail diminished capacity for the nation (Held 1996; Pierre and Peters 2000; Weiss 1998). Broadened governance can increase the capacity for achieving objectives through cooperative effort, at least in some circumstances. Nor does cooperation inevitably require the elimination of cross-national conflict. As Stoker has shown for implementation regimes in federal systems, cooperation sometimes can be built on enduring patterns of conflict (1991).

Interdependent nations that are engaged in strategic decision making may find stable cooperative approaches that help each (all) to achieve objectives despite differing interests. Indeed, the fact of interdependence may make effective action more likely rather than less—depending on the circumstances. All or most nations may have an interest in establishing systems to monitor the epidemiology of certain diseases, for example, just as the vast majority share a collective interest in suppressing terrorist threats. In the case of the long-range transport of air pollution (“acid rain”), all signatory countries supported the creation of an effective scheme for monitoring emissions and identifying their countries of origin. Once such a system was created, the “mere” fact of a monitoring system gave impetus

to serious national efforts to show their willingness to comply—so long as others did likewise. The result has been a surprisingly effective regime (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993; Underdal and Hanf 2000).

The details of this example support the notion of continued roles for state systems and public administration. The permanent staff of the regime numbers less than 10 for a set of multilateral agreements covering five pollutants and 34 countries. Virtually all of the action is handled through and mostly by the participating states through working groups within the overall framework of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (although the countries involved extend beyond Europe and include the United States). The international agreements have facilitated a set of understandings that could not have been achieved by any single nation, even a hegemonic one. Virtually all states gain from a collective agreement, even though none would have had an interest in going down that path alone. The resulting cooperation has increased the capacity of all participants to address issues beyond what they would have been able to achieve on their own. Yet the regime that has emerged is dwarfed by the scale and capacities of any of the members. International agreements have had major impacts on public administration, but the nations and their administrative systems clearly have not been pushed aside. This case is merely one of a substantial number of functionally specific regimes that have proliferated in all directions. Some have been highly successful, others exhibit mixed records; some have been resisted by the United States (for example, an agreement banning the use of land mines, an effort to establish an international criminal court), and others have had too little experience to evaluate at this point. As is the case within a country, the devil in transnational governance lies in the details. The lessons for responding to international terrorism are direct. State administrative systems will remain central in addressing this agenda; functionally specific, multilateral international regimes will likely play key roles; and the nuances of their design are certain to be critical.

One can glimpse into the medium-term future more generally by looking across the Atlantic. Over decades, elements of transnational governance have emerged among the set of member states of the European Union (EU). Specialists in both U.S. and EU governance have much to learn from each other (Howse and Nicolaidis 2001), and the EU is instructive on central issues here.

European-level institutions have evolved considerably, but they remain tiny by comparison with those in the member states. The European Commission numbers some 16,000 employees, of whom only a core of around 4,000 permanent officials exercise some kind of executive function (Morata 1998, 119).<sup>5</sup> “Subsidiarity” has served as an operational benchmark for whether and how to Europeanize decisions and where to conduct administration. Dif-

ferent multilevel governance arrangements have developed in many fields of policy (symbolized by the Directorates-General). But the national governments of the member states, along with their national bureaucracies, have remained centrally influential. They are active at the European level, and any decisions are implemented—if at all—through the national systems. The emergence of European regimes has not signaled the collapse or even the diminution of public administration, let alone of national governance.

One additional analogy is pertinent: intergovernmental relations within the United States. Here the comparison is imperfect, but the U.S. experiment, designed without unitary authority, has functioned over an extended period. Hundreds of functionally specific arrays link institutions and decision makers without causing subnational units to atrophy. While the system exhibits plenty of difficulties and is often criticized on equity grounds, it demonstrates that multilevel systems that lack a straightforward authority chain can deliver effective governance. Similarly, international governance is unlikely to siphon most talent and influence from national settings.

National decision makers, including administrative experts, can be expected to be the principal decision makers at the international level, as they have been during the period in which the current systems have developed.

None of this is to deny the reality of profound challenges to inherited notions of sovereignty, nor to challenge the reality of shifts of influence. Huddleston, for instance, refers to a “disarticulation of the state” as well as a “hollowing.” In contrast, even without considering the transnational dimension, Light (1999) has documented the extent to which the “shadow” of the state now reaches far beyond the usual measurement of size or capacity.

If one includes contract-created jobs stimulated by U.S. federal commitments, state and local positions generated as a result of national policy, and subnational positions staffed by those responding to federal mandates, Light estimates a shadow of approximately 12.7 million beyond the 1.9 million in the civilian employ of Washington.<sup>6</sup> Such rough totals indicate an impressively large shadow. How to interpret the phenomenon remains at issue. Most new federal programs are administered otherwise than through a single national agency delivering services (Hall and O’Toole 2000). From one perspective, this pattern does bear the marks of a “hollowing.” Yet it also indicates that the reach of federal influence goes far past the official national apparatus. The contracting phenomenon and its allied developments increase the demands and responsibilities placed on federal managers and require new, more intricate skills (Rainey 1997). Similarly, pressures toward transnational decision making place greater demands on domestic administrators.

Kettl (2000) has indicated that recent dynamics have pushed simultaneously toward globalization and also internal devolution (Light documents some of the latter while ignoring the former). The patterns have evolved into intricate forms that demand the serious attention of scholars and practitioners. But the evidence points away from a withering of the state and toward disaggregated, multilevel, institutionally complex, interdependent arrays. Governance extends beyond governments (Heinrich and Lynn 2000; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999), and the patterns show a spread of state-like functions across institutions within and beyond the territorial nation. But the developing webs include the state—they do not preclude it. This portrait suggests neither a neomedieval disorder nor a potent global apparatus eclipsing the nations. Instead, a new, halting, little-understood form of governance has emerged, one embedding nations in broader systems comprising national actors that are multilaterally self-bound to explore directed, mutual problem solving. If so, this view entails manifold implications for public administration in the United States and elsewhere. The entrance of American public administration into the new, globalizing world presages a substantial increase in challenge and expectations. How and why?

## Implications for American Public Administration

Any sketch of how globalization can be expected to influence U.S. public administration must be partially speculative, even if several key features are already discernible. But the analysis already presented, along with data on recent administrative developments, suggests an outline. Public administrators and other government experts are involved in myriad ways, and will become more so, in the international dimensions of policy and management. The mutual influences are especially direct and obvious at the national level, but subnational administrators are not insulated. Furthermore, as has been emphasized in this article, these patterns are clearly a part of the response to terrorism, but they extend further—across fields, agencies, and sectors.

Some administrative officials—thus far, almost exclusively national—participate directly in international activities. Virtually all federal cabinet-level departments have specialized units to deal with international aspects of their missions. Thousands of administrators exchange information with their counterparts in other countries or are involved in negotiations. The existence of so many such agreements and their periodic review and revision should make this point obvious. U.S. administrators, and not merely those in the State Department, are active in international meetings, interact regularly with administrative bodies or secretariats of international regimes, and evalu-

ate and monitor the impact and effectiveness of international commitments.

Many more administrators and federal experts are implicated in international dimensions of policy and administration. Agreements carry domestic ramifications, particularly during their execution (Hanf and Underdal 1996). Up and down the chain, national administrators analyze the implications of options that are being considered in and through international regimes. To the extent that agencies' turf is involved, such units not only anticipate and react to events and decisions, but also advise other units of new commitments, discuss and disseminate the concrete details in a variety of directions, and prepare reports often required as part of commitments entered into by the United States. These duties may entail the development of routine contacts and exchanges with counterparts elsewhere and possibly joint implementation in more than one country.

These ramifications are not “merely” internal to administrative units. Many international commitments embrace objectives and carry implications that must be dealt with through a broader set of units domestically (Lambright 1997). This point is particularly obvious as the United States has responded to international terrorism with a new Office of Homeland Security and coordination imperatives touching upon scores of agencies. Again, however, the dynamic extends more broadly across many additional policy and administrative realms. Implementation requirements are likely to accelerate the push toward coordination among agencies that share responsibilities. While there are many domestic pressures for increased interagency collaboration (O'Toole 1997), the growing set of international commitments constitutes an additional impetus. An agreement about banning the international transport of endangered species, for instance, connects the Customs Bureau with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Bureau of Fish and Wildlife. Similarly, acid rain protocols tie the State Department, the EPA, and the Departments of Energy and Commerce (Weiss and Jacobson 1998).

In addition, the internationalization of agency business influences the distribution of power among subunits and programs, may stimulate internal restructuring, and differentially affects the preferences of interest groups. Again, note the continuing debate about structuring for homeland security.

The ramifications also extend into additional venues, one of which is legislative. Some international agreements introduce complicated matters onto the congressional agenda. These include a range of currently salient aspects of the terrorist threat, such as the security of dismantled nuclear warheads in Russia, but also many other matters across the spectrum of U.S. policy challenges. The 1987 Montreal Protocol to limit depletion of the ozone layer is one example. This kind of initiative signals an additional

involvement of administrators as well. The full process for turning the idea of an international commitment into action is complex (Weiss and Jacobson 1998), but, at a minimum, the legislative affairs offices of relevant agencies, general counsels' offices, and the relevant units of substantive experts can be expected to be involved in briefings, legislative hearings, preparation of reports and testimony, and drafting of legislation.

Beyond involvement in legislative matters, international commitments may trigger the creation or revision of regulations. The ozone agreement catalyzed a shift in regulatory standards (the "Stratospheric Ozone Rule" issued by EPA under the Clean Air Act) that set forth limits on producing and importing substances controlled by the Protocol. U.S. regulatory strategy involves the EPA with the Customs Service to facilitate the review of import and export data and to minimize confusion among the regulated community. These actions involve administrators in important details that can turn an international commitment into reality. Nor is administration solely reactive to "the international regime." Administrators are involved from the outset in conducting analyses, outlining options, framing negotiating positions, reviewing implications, and so on.

International agreements can provide ammunition for a variety of domestic actors whose preferences regarding policy and administration are affected. This point is abundantly clear in numerous discussions surrounding post-September 11 issues, as well as in less visible but crucial aspects of policy on topics such as the environment. Without and within the government, international entanglements create winners and losers, often gradually. Inevitably, international commitment is not a perfect representation of what would have been decided domestically. The stakes, stakeholders, and balance of power are shifted by the addition of an international dimension. Connections to the transnational level shift the discourse and pressures of domestic politics, including administrative politics, and introduce new considerations. Public administrators are both transmitters and targets in such reconfigured decision making. The Kyoto agreement is an example: Following the Bush administration's controversial decision to disavow the accord in early 2001, domestic attention focused on the issue anew, environmental groups became more active, and the administration began a series of high-level briefings to inform key decision makers about the science and economics of global climate change—something that almost certainly would not have ensued without the connection at the international level. Many of those conducting the briefings were U.S. government experts who had not had such high-level access before (*New York Times*, April 28, 2001, A1). Eventually, a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences, including some government scientists, reported directly to the White House by presi-

dential request—all important inputs to the reevaluation and development of U.S. policy.

Particularly notable are the roles opened up to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly international NGOs (INGOs), a point that is virtually ignored in the research literature on U.S. public administration. INGOs have become particularly visible and sometimes influential on transnational issues, including the development and execution of agreements. Many INGOs have become aware of the growing importance of international agreements and have become active participants in the negotiations. Many such venues make explicit provision for involvement by INGOs as well as national governments. In several important cases, these INGOs have brokered among national decision makers, developing options, presenting information meant to shape the outcomes of debate, working with other such groups at the transnational level, and pressuring nations in support of actions and agreements—including through the potential for negative publicity (Parsons 1993; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998, 305–517).

U.S. administrators may find their political environments complicated by such developments. On occasion, the addition of the international level and the changed balance of power evident there can offer chances to ally with INGOs and others to help shape shifts in U.S. positions—even if the domestic short-term political calculus would make such decisions difficult. Often, international agreements also can "empower" domestic actors—for instance, NGOs—by establishing national commitments to take actions to meet jointly decided objectives. Monitoring progress, pressuring administrative officials, and calling attention to non-compliance are some of the "watchdog" activities of these groups. The new administrative responsibilities, with their potential for expanding initial authority and resources, can create institutional and professional interests on the part of implementing officials in defending the integrity of the programs and extending the initial commitment. These government actors often form alliances with supporters and other beneficiaries of the treaty.

## Internationalization and Functions of Public Management

This article has sketched a variety of ways that internationalization influences American public administration. Discussion has touched on the policy process, including implementation; administrative structure; policy analysis; and bureaucratic politics. Basic managerial functions are influenced by such forces as well. One example is personnel. While international organizations are unlikely to experience a substantial "bulking" at the expense of national administration, internationalization shapes the perspectives



of U.S. administrators. The professional orientations of those involved are molded by their interactions, especially collegial ties with others working on similar challenges. As a result, administrators are likely to develop a more transnational perspective, and the channels of influence are mutual. Personnel who were formally employed by international bodies or by other nations interact increasingly with their American counterparts. Results here include some “Americanization” of the perspectives in these settings as well.

Internationalization also shapes decision making in budgeting and finance. Connections can be quite direct, such as international agreements committing countries to lowering tariffs and other trade barriers—decisions that shape the macroeconomy, shifting fortunes of industries and employment in particular locales. All of these influence domestic politics and public finance.

Budgetary impacts also can be substantial. Just as “unfunded mandates” have exasperated subnational decision makers, international agreements can commit the United States to actions that enmesh national and subnational spending—as in the challenges being faced now to upgrade capacity to respond to public health and other aspects of bioterrorism. This is a relatively new experience for national decision makers. As subnational experience attests, such decisions do not necessarily vitiate authority or silence voice, even if international influences can bind uncomfortably at times.

Connections between globalizing dynamics and subnational public administration are also real, even if less direct. An environmental example again makes the point. Note the so-called “Local Agenda 21” process encouraged by the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which calls for communities to embark on participatory processes of planning for a sustainable future. In some policy fields, subnational officials and managers have moved beyond their national counterparts in participating in internationally driven changes. There is growing interest, for example, in encouraging sustainable communities. “Many U.S. cities have joined the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives’ (ICLEI) Cities for Climate Protection programme [and] have put in place action plans to protect the global climate and reduce local air pollution. Several major cities have embraced the goal of a 20 per cent reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions, and a few have reduced emissions by as much as 15 per cent since 1995” (Bryner 2000, 283, 299). Although Washington has shunned the Kyoto Protocol, many state and local governments have taken steps to address the concerns. In August 2001, for instance, the six New England states joined five eastern Canadian provinces in a pact to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—thus illustrating both the transnational and subnational trends. The agreement includes quantitative and

ambitious goals (*Los Angeles Times*, October 8, 2001, A1).

International links to subnational administration may be even more significant for regulation and associated questions of budgeting and finance. U.S. case law stipulates that, generally, an international commitment “trumps state law that adopts a contrary requirement” (O’Reilly 1997; see *Missouri v. Holland* [1920]), including voter-initiated state law. Such conflicts are not yet visible on the post-September 11 front, but they can be seen in other fields. Some have already emerged between trade obligations and subnational environmental requirements. Unlike domestic intergovernmental differences, however, this constraint on state action *limits* the kinds of regulation that a number of states have adopted in recent years.

There are two points here: International obligations may effectively direct and influence spending by states and localities. Second, the law commits subnational authorities to the international commitments of national authorities. The implication of both is likely to be increased involvement of subnational actors, including administrators, in monitoring the development of international agreements, as well as in lobbying national authorities and others. Such a process is already quite visible in Europe—for instance, through the European Council of Municipalities and Regions, which operates directly at the European level to influence decisions.

Such efforts are likely to be complex, just as intergovernmental relations are domestically. California may care deeply about strengthening its environmental constraints, while Texas desires more growth-oriented international commitments; they may operate at cross purposes. Still, more jurisdictions will look for points of leverage internationally. These developments necessitate a change in subnational administrators’ understanding of the system in which they operate.

For many dimensions of U.S. public administration, then, and for multiple levels of domestic governance, there are implications for regulation and management, organizational structuring, human resources management, and budgeting and finance. Influences are mutual and multidirectional. The nation-state remains vigorous in the emerging pattern of governance, but America has clearly entered a system of broader and more complex influence. Further, U.S. administration is significant in the globalizing world, even if it is undeniably altered in crucial respects.

## Concluding Observations

The current administration arrived in office vowing to nurture old friendships abroad, but instead it irritated many nations with its approaches to the Kyoto Protocol, setting aside of the antiballistic missile treaty, pursuit of its anti-

missile system, and reluctance to accept constraints of multilateral arms control. To other countries, America has often seemed prepared to operate on its own, happy if others wanted to tag along, unconcerned if they did not. Since September 11, many Americans may have come to feel differently about their vulnerability, their power, and the need to exercise it in faraway places to feel safe at home.

The assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrate that America cannot simply look to its own defense and forget the world outside. But it should have long been clear that the United States needs to work with other countries to achieve its aims. An international terrorist attack needs an international response, as do many other pressing policy challenges. The effective pursuit of the country's interests, security or otherwise, requires continuing involvement in a variety of international efforts. U.S. public administration is already an essential part of such involvement in a host of fields.

The structure of the world has not changed since September 11. Rather, the nascent system of global governance has confronted yet another problem that calls for a joint response of many countries: to defeat the immediate threat of global terrorism and to deal with the social, economic, and political problems that have created conditions on which such movements feed. In this sense, the attacks on the United States and the mobilization of an effective international response illustrate how globalization has set the agenda to which the international community responds and the institutional context through which countries define their interests and seek to shape as well as use the international institutions through which joint efforts can be organized.

The globalized future of public administration is already emerging, and the range extends far beyond international terrorism and national security. The context is not a worldwide government, and the U.S. content is not an increasingly irrelevant public administration. Developments are on their way into a more firmly institutionalized, polycentric system based largely on a multitude of functionally specific international regimes. Few of these are fully global, and none is busy performing basic state functions. Nor does the likely future offer an administrative apparatus passively enforcing norms set by some powerful, nongeographically rooted, nonstate head.

Territory will not disappear as a point of reference in determining administrative responsibilities. Increasingly, actors at all levels face the imperative of collaborating with others, public and private, from various jurisdictions and levels to deal with the problems that surpass the resources and problem-solving capacities of their territorially defined units. Accordingly, there are consequences for public management. The challenge is to reassess how to organize and how to do the public's business. Such internationalization

extends the scope of governance while magnifying its complexity. These developments continue, even as the analytical and normative categories through which they are assessed and understood increasingly call out for redefinition.

In the midst of such dynamism, students and practitioners of public administration have key roles in making sense of the implications of transnational governance for the systems of participating nations, including the United States. Administrative actors must become aware of the nature of the interrelated processes of globalization, particularly for their own effective and responsible functioning.<sup>7</sup> The administrative community confronts the tasks of adjusting traditional practices, creating new ways of organizing and managing collaborative endeavors, and fashioning new administrative institutions to enable political communities to manage global processes that, in turn, reshape the world. Success requires a better understanding of the challenges being faced by administrators at all levels. The focus of administrative work is being redefined, the managerial environment is becoming more entwined, and the demands for new skills to handle shifting sets of relations within and without one's own organizational unit are increasing.

In these contexts, challenges are to develop the capacities of local, state, and national administrations so they can function in the world of multilevel action through which governance increasingly operates. Such complexity requires administrators to function simultaneously in multiple "worlds" of action. Achieving this, in turn, requires the pursuit of an innovative research agenda that is designed to analyze vital changes, accurately sketch their implications, assist in the development of new tools for managing in complex albeit partially collaborative polycentric settings, and consider afresh the tendentious normative challenges accompanying the expanded scope but diffused accountability inherent in joint action.

This set of challenges constitutes an overfull agenda, and the core argument of this article is that it fits the real world of today, not some speculative and distant future. If so, this is a time to be responsibly engaged in developments that are reshaping public administration globally.

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## Acknowledgments

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We acknowledge with gratitude the helpful suggestions provided by Stefanie Lindquist and anonymous reviewers. The authors are responsible for the contents.

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## Notes

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1. At least three descriptors can be used to signify the broad dynamics sketched in this article: global, transnational, and international. Nuanced differences distinguish these, but for present purposes little may be gained by unpacking them. Care is taken to use the terms appropriately in the text of this article.
2. An additional complication in the developing institutional arrangements, as Roberts (2002) has indicated, is the development of “novel transjurisdictional service systems,” often involving corporations committing to contracts with governments in many different countries. These developments carry myriad implications for public administration, but they are not explored in the present analysis.
3. This figure includes both protocols and revisions of earlier-enacted agreements. Each is counted as a separate agreement.
4. Recent work by Welch and Wong (2001) reflects much more understanding of how global forces, including the development of “global institutions,” can create domestic pressures for increased bureaucratic scope and size. This work is promising, but it needs to be supplemented by attention to the full scope of the emerging governance arrangements.
5. The bureaucracy in Brussels includes a very small permanent executive service. The majority of the employees are engaged in translation, research, and internships, or they are on secondment from national bureaucracies.
6. These figures omit more than 850,000 postal workers and 1.5 million in the military.
7. Critical issues of accountability and responsibility arise in such a context, as many have observed. These are left unaddressed in the present article for reasons of space.

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